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Invoicing in a multi-currency world
In which currency should exporters set the price of their goods? When selling to a foreign market, an exporting firm can invoice the transaction in its own currency, in the currency of the destination country, or in a third "vehicle" currency. This invoicing decision plays a central role for the transmission of shocks across countries, by affecting the extent to which exchange rate movements alter international relative prices. Despite its relevance, the optimal strategy is not straightforward from a theoretical perspective, and the empirical evidence remains piecemeal.
In this paper, we explore the pattern and the determinants of invoicing using a new multi-country data set. We first provide perspective on this issue by using a simple model that encompasses the main driving forces behind invoicing decisions, namely industry characteristics, such as price sensitivity of demand and economies of scale, the volatility in macroeconomic variables, such as wages and aggregate demand, and transaction costs in foreign exchange markets. The model synthesizes arguments advanced in the broader literature and extends them to incorporate the use of a vehicle currency. Our analysis stresses a "coalescing" effect among exporters, with a particular firm invoicing in line with its competitors in order to limit the movement of its relative price. This dimension reflects industry characteristics and is especially relevant when goods are close substitutes and when demand fluctuations raise average marginal costs because of decreasing returns to scale. The stronger this effect, the more likely it is that a single currency takes a dominant role.
Exactly which currency takes this dominant role can reflect several factors. First, the currency of a large country has an advantage, as foreign producers selling to that country aim to limit the movements of their prices relative to that of local producers who dominate the market and invoice in the local currency. The dominant role of a large country's currency extends further to other markets when firms are restricted to use the same currency for all their exports. Second, a currency with low transaction costs in foreign exchange markets, is also well poised to play a dominant role in invoicing. Third, while theoretical arguments point to a role for macroeconomic variability, it is likely to be more limited and concentrated in the invoicing of differentiated products for which demand is relatively insensitive to prices.
Our simple model provides a background for our novel presentation of extensive empirical evidence on the currency invoicing of international trade for 24 countries. We first confirm the well-known fact that the U.S. dollar is the primary, albeit not unique, invoice currency choice in flows to and from the United States. In addition, the dollar plays a sizable role for many countries in transactions that do not involve the United States. We also document an increasing role of the euro for European Union and accession countries.
The novel contributions of our empirical analysis are the construction of measures for the invoicing determinants identified in the model, and their use in an econometric analysis of trade invoicing. The model indicates that the coalescing effect is most relevant in industries where buyers can easily substitute between competing producers. We verify this pattern for the few countries with detailed invoicing data at the industry level, with the U.S. dollar being more widely used for trade in more homogeneous products. As only aggregate invoicing data are available for the full sample of 24 countries, we determine the shares of a country's exports and imports that are in homogeneous and high elasticity of substitution goods by applying the Rauch (1999) indices to trade flows. 2 We find that a larger prevalence of more homogeneous goods (those that are reference-priced and traded on organized exchange) is associated with greater use of dollars in currency invoicing. This is robust to controls for the United States as a direct trading partner. We also find a role for the size of an exporter's country relative to its destination market, especially if "country' is defined from a currency bloc perspective. Similar findings surface in tests of determinants of euro use in invoicing, with export destination, exporter size, export composition and proximity to the euro area being significant factors.
We construct measures of transaction costs in foreign exchange markets from data on bid-ask spread for each currency relative to the U.S. dollar, the euro (or previously the Deutschemark), and the pound. Transacting through the dollar nearly always entails a lower cost, reflecting its prominent role in the turnover of foreign exchange market (BIS 2005) . 3 We find some exceptions for some smaller European countries in recent years, which help account for their relatively heavy use of the euro. Our empirical analysis nonetheless finds only a moderate role for transaction cost considerations.
Finally, the theory predicts a role for macroeconomic volatility through co-movements between exchange rates and exporters' marginal costs, with exporters having an incentive to invoice in the currency that offers the best hedge against cost fluctuations stemming from movements in aggregate demand and wages. We capture this aspect by regressing exchange rates on a measure of costs that we construct. While this hedging channel is not important for most of the sample of countries studied, a number of countries --Australia, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom and the United States --had hedging motives supporting a strong dollar preference for invoicing their exports to the other regions in the 1970s. This role faded subsequently. In the 1990s some euro preference emerged for Korea, Luxembourg, and
Poland, while Hungary retained dollar preference.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, with an emphasis on recent contributions. The various drivers of invoicing are combined in a simple theoretical model in Section 3. Section 4 presents and analyzes the new multi-country dataset that we have assembled. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature.
Our analysis builds on a rich history of thought on vehicle currency selection that has highlighted several complementary determinants of invoicing. A first line of research focuses on the role of currencies as medium of exchange, focusing on financial transactions instead of trade. Swoboda (1968 Swoboda ( , 1969 stressed the role of transaction costs in foreign exchange markets and the benefit of using currencies associated with low transaction costs. Such low costs could reflect a high degree of liquidity in the foreign exchange markets for the currencies in question, as pointed out by Portes and Rey (1999) . Rey (2001) elegantly exposited this theme in a three-country general equilibrium model, confirming the importance of a currency's "thick market externalities" that arise from a large presence in global international trade and low transaction costs of exchange. Devereux and Shi (2005) model foreign exchange trading as taking place through trading posts, which are costly to set up, and
show that a vehicle currency, through which all trading takes place, can emerge as a way to minimize setup costs.
A second line of analysis focuses on industry characteristics. McKinnon (1979) argued that industries comprised of goods that are homogeneous and traded in specialized markets are likely to have transactions invoiced in a single low transaction cost currency. Since many currencies could potentially serve as the reference currency in these markets, which one plays the role may be inertial. Krugman (1980) argued that once a currency is established as the dominant one in a market, a particular firm has no incentive to invoice in an alternative currency as this would lead to higher transaction cost and more volatile sales because of movements in its price relative to its competitors'. Once a currency has acquired a prominent role, it may keep this role even if another currency with similarly low costs emerges.
A third line of argument emphasizes that invoicing currency selection is driven by the role of volatility in macroeconomic variables in different countries. Firms have an incentive to invoice their trade in the currency of a country where the volatility of shocks, such as those arising from monetary aggregates, is moderate, as this will ceteris paribus minimize the fluctuations in the exchange rates associated with the currency in questions. Baron (1976) and then Giovannini (1988) were among the first researchers to formalize the role such variability on both producer profit maximization and the selection of either exporter or importer currencies for trade transactions. Empirically, recent work by Wilander (2006) finds a role for exchange rate volatility in the invoicing of Swedish exporters. The most extensive theoretical works in this area are the recent contributions by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) and Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) , who provide jumping off points for our simple model. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) , hereafter BvW, stress the role of industry structure as reflected in the price elasticity of demand and the convexity of production cost.
They argue that an exporter has an incentive to stabilize the price in the currency of her customers when demand is highly elastic and marginal costs are increasing with output.
Intuitively, failing to do so leads to fluctuations in demand, the more so the higher the price elasticity of demand. This raises average marginal cost when production costs are convex.
BvW also point to the presence of what we call a coalescing effect through which the exporter has an incentive to invoice in the currency used by the majority of her competitors in order to limits output volatility. We expand on the analysis of BvW, who mainly focused on the exchange rate as the source of volatility, by including fluctuations in factor prices and shifts in foreign demand, as well as a transaction cost in the foreign exchange market. This allows us to contrast the interaction of the coalescing motive with macroeconomic factors and the role of transaction costs.
Macroeconomic volatility is emphasized by Devereux, Engel and Storegaard (2004) , hereafter DES, who examine the role for monetary fluctuations in the invoicing decision using a general equilibrium setup in a two country world. They show that exporters set their prices in the currency of the country where monetary shocks are the least volatile. 4 Engel (2006) uses a similar setup to highlight the parallels between the choice of invoicing when prices are sticky and the optimal degree of exchange rate pass-through when prices are flexible.
Our illustrative model merges these key insights. We choose to analyze the invoicing choice of a firm in a partial equilibrium approach, in contrast to BvW and DES. 5 While a general equilibrium approach offers obvious advantages, it comes with two drawbacks that we avoid in a partial equilibrium setting. First, we do not need to take a stance on the exact shocks driving the economy. Both BvW and DES focus on monetary shocks, and their conclusions may be specific to these shocks. Second, we do not need to specify a model of exchange rate determination. Since a well-established literature shows the difficulty of predicting and explains exchange rates over the horizon of the exporter pricing decisions, our approach better reflects a dimension of international economics that regrettably remains unsettled in empirical research.
4 Haug (2003, 2002) look at the role of exchange rate volatility in driving the invoicing decision for Canadian trade transactions. They conclude that a higher volatility makes LCP more attractive, or VCP provided that goods are not too substitutable. These conclusions are in contrast to the ones discussed above. In their model output is preset first, prices are set, and then sales take place. The more standard models have prices set first and then output demand determined. See also Oi, Otani, and Shirota (2004) in which a general equilibrium model of invoice currency choice is presented and applied to Japanese data. Hartmann (1998) explores vehicle currency choice from a market microstructure perspective.
A three-country / three currency model of invoicing
This section provides a concise way to contrast the various drivers of invoicing, and identify major patterns that motivate the empirical exercise of section 4. For brevity we focus on the main intuitive message, with detailed derivations presented in an appendix available upon request. We start by presenting the key elements and results of the model, before discussing the intuitive interpretation, as well as possible extensions, and deriving testable implications.
Invoicing in a multi-currency world
Firms post prices for their goods before knowing the realization of various shocks affecting the economy. We assume that the currency used in invoicing is also the one used in the actual payment, in line with the evidence in Friberg and Wilander (2007) . Consider an exporter located in country e that produces a brand z and sells it in the destination country d.  being high).
The exporter produces using a technology with decreasing returns to scale and faces a downward-sloping demand for her goods:
(1) 

is a transaction cost. The exporter sets her price in currency k to maximize discounted expected profits:
where e D is the state-specific discount factor at which profits are evaluated and time subscripts are omitted for expositional convenience. 9 .
8 The Appendix presents the derivations when the production function uses two inputs, where one of them could be imported with a price affected by the exchange rate. Novy (2006) discusses the role of imported inputs, but focuses on a technology with constant returns to scale. 9 We consider that the firm is owned by agents in the exporting country, so profits are discounted using the marginal utility of income for these agents. This is done without loss of generality: while a resident of another country would value profits after converting them in her own currency, this has no impact on the optimal invoicing decision that is the focus of the paper. All we require is that the owner treats her marginal utility of 8
The profit maximization proceeds in two steps. We first choose 
where lower case letters denote logs. We assume that a share
 is invoiced in currency e, and a share
The ex-post impact of exchange rate movements on the relative price between an individual firm and its competitors then reflects any discrepancy between the firm's invoicing shares ('s) and the aggregate invoicing shares ('s):
Full stabilization of the relative price in (4) requires the exporter to invoice in line with her competitors:
The second stage of the optimization substitutes the optimal price    , treating aggregate demand and prices, input prices, and exchange rates as exogenous variables. A technical hurdle is that the profit expression (2) is a highly non-linear function of the invoicing shares. We address this problem by expressing (2) in terms of a quadratic log approximation around a point where the economy is not affected by any shocks.
Three points are to be noted at this stage. First, while invoicing shares are not defined in a situation where there are no shocks, as all currencies are equivalent because exchange rates never move, all other variables are well-defined. Second, a linear approximation of (2) is not enough. Intuitively, the invoicing decision can be understood at a risk-minimizing one, with the firm picking an invoicing strategy that hedges its marginal costs, as detailed below.
income as independent from the profits of a particular firm, in a similar way as she treats the consumer price index as independent from the price set by a particular firm. This point is discussed in Engel (2006) Such considerations involve the various variances and covariances in the model, and are only captured by a quadratic approximation of (2). These two aspects highlight the similarity between the invoicing decision and the choice of financial portfolios in macroeconomic models, which addresses similar technical issues, as discussed in Devereux and Sutherland (2006) and Tille and vanWincoop (2007) .
Third, our analysis is subject to the same shortcoming as all exercises relying on approximation methods, namely that it loses its accuracy if shocks are large. In particular, our assumptions of small shocks and a finite price-elasticity of demand (albeit a possibly large one) ensure that an individual firm always faces a positive demand at the posted price, and that it is profitable to meet this demand as the shock is not large enough to erase its unit margin. Our model then differs from the analysis in Fisher (1989) who considers a case where goods are perfect substitutes and marginal costs are constant. Under Bertrand competition, he shows that exchange rate movements lead some firms to drop out of the market.
The quadratic approximation of (2) leads to an expression where the invoicing strategy only enters through terms that are quadratic in the transaction cost k e  , the exchange rate ek s , and the firm's price relative to its competitors,
. Maximizing this expression with respect to the invoicing shares leads to the following expressions: 
The measure ed m captures the exogenous drivers of marginal costs, namely movements in factor prices and fluctuations in aggregate demand: 
which is large when brands are close substitutes (  is high) and decreasing returns to scale are pronounced ( is low).
An intuitive interpretation of the determinants of invoicing.
We discuss the intuition behind (5)- (7) in terms of the deviations from the benchmark where prices are set entirely in the exporter's currency
), which fully stabilizes the price that the exporter receives in her own currency for each unit sold. (5)- (7) show three reasons to deviate from this benchmark.
The first reason, captured by the first term on the right-hand side of (5)- (6), reflects a "coalescing" motive: an exporter has an incentive to follow the invoicing strategy of its competitors as reflected in The invoicing shares (5)- (6) also highlight the relative magnitude of the three aspects.
First, the coalescing motive can play a substantial role. While it is irrelevant when demand is price inelastic ( = 0) or marginal costs are constant ( = 1), it quickly becomes significant once we move away from this corner case. Taking standard values of  = 0.65 and  = 6 11 implies a value of 0.76 for  , giving a substantial role to the coalescing motive.
Second, the high volatility of exchange rates relative to marginal costs and demand dampens the role of macroeconomic volatility. The  terms in (5)- (7) Third, the coalescing motive plays a large role compared to transaction costs in foreign
In a model with a constant returns to scale technology in labor and a fixed factor, such as capital, a labor share of 65 % is a standard specification. A value of 6 for the elasticity of substitution corresponds to a 20% markup.
Elasticities of this magnitude, or even higher, are a common parametrization.
12 Frankel and Rose (1995) show that volatility of industrialized countries' exchange rates is an order of magnitude higher than volatility in fundamentals. Engel and West (2004) treat exchange rates as reflective of a discounted stream of expected future fundamentals. 0.5. 13 The monthly volatility between G3 currencies suggests to a variance of exchange rates of 0.09%. The magnitude of the transaction costs can be proxied by the available evidence on bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market, with Hau and al (2002) invoicing, , in terms of the impact on the invoicing share . Therefore a sizable change in transaction costs, of the same magnitude as their average value, is equivalent to a moderate change in the competitors' invoicing choice.
While our assumption of invoicing in a basket currency k can appear disputable, there is a close parallel between the invoicing shares (5)- (7) and the choice of invoicing fully in one currency. A situation where exporters pick a high share for the vehicle currency
 is a situation where exporters pick that currency when restricted to fully invoice in one currency.
The optimal invoicing shares (5)- (7) are computed from the point of view of a single firm. Our empirical analysis however relies on aggregated data, raising the issue of how the aggregate weights 's are linked to the firm-specific weights 's. A particular concern is that while coalescing matters for an individual firm, it could play no aggregate role. Specifically, if all firms are identical, the 's and the 's coincide and the invoicing is driven by the last two terms in (5)-(7). While coalescing plays no role in aggregate terms in this specific example, it matters in more general examples. The key point is that when some firms pick invoicing shares that deviate from (5)- (7), other firms have a strong incentive to follow suit.
A related aspect is that country size matters. Exporters face competition by local firms in the destination country who set prices fully in their own currency. This tilts the 's in (5)- (6) towards the currency of the destination market, leading exporters to alter their invoicing accordingly, the more so when structural features are conducive to a coalescing effect (  is high). We therefore expect exports to a large country to be substantially invoiced in that country's currency. Country size can also have an indirect effect. In deriving (5)- (7) we assumed that the exporter's invoicing decision for a market is not driven by considerations from other markets. We can extend our setup by assuming that exporters sell across many 13 This corresponds to a model where exchange rates are driven by independent monetary shocks of equal variances.
markets and have to pick the same invoicing currency for all sales. 14 The invoicing shares are then of the same form as (5)- (7), except that the shares , the cost ed m and the transaction cost  are weighed averages of the corresponding measures in the various export markets, with the weights reflecting market size. The invoicing strategy is then dominated by the larger markets. In particular, if exporters face substantial local competition in a large export market, they give a large weight to that country's currency in the invoicing of all exports.
A final point in the discussion of the model is the specific structure of price setting.
We assume that firms are price setters, taking the demand they face into account, and commit to a price in advance. Our setup therefore differs from a price taker setup where firms face perfect competition. While out model encompasses the case of perfect competition, where the elasticity of demand, , is infinite, this does not exactly represents the price taker case, where the firm takes the world price as given. Getting to that case requires that we also relax the assumption that prices are preset. If prices are set after the realization of the shocks, the "coalescing" motive that we described above disappears, as does the use of invoicing to hedge against movements in marginal costs. The invoicing is then driven solely by the transaction costs in foreign exchange markets, with the firm choosing the currency with the lowest costs.
The invoicing is also driven by transaction costs in foreign exchange markets in an alternative specification where the price and quantities are set at a transaction time, while the actual settlement takes place at a subsequent time, with the exchange rate possibly moving between the two periods. 15 Despite these limitations, we think that our model captures dimensions that are relevant. Eichenbaum and al. (2008) for instance show that while prices move frequently, they do so around a reference level that is infrequently adjusted. In addition, the empirical evidence presented below finds little role for transaction costs in foreign exchange markets.
Aggregate invoicing and empirical considerations
Our discussion above can be summarized by five testable implications.
Hypothesis 1: the exports of industries where goods are more homogenous should be invoiced in narrower groups of currencies, or even a single one. The exact choice of currency 14 The detailed steps are presented in an Appendix available on request. 15 A detailed derivation of these alternative settings is available upon request.
reflects considerations such as low transaction costs. By contrast, invoicing in industries with highly differentiated goods is likely to be spread across the various currencies.
Hypothesis 2: the share of invoicing in the currency of the destination country should be higher for larger countries. Large countries' currencies can also dominate the invoicing of exports to other markets when exporters are constrained to invoice all their exports in the same currency.
Hypothesis 3: the size of the exporter's country also matters. Exporters from small countries are less likely to play a dominant role in the destination market, hence less likely to invoice in their own currencies. In addition, producers in small countries are more likely to rely on imported inputs than firms in larger economies (Campa and Goldberg 2007) . If inputs are then invoiced in a dominant currency, this reduces the propensity of producers in small countries to invoice in their own currency.
Hypothesis 4: macroeconomic volatility should affect invoicing decisions through the correlations between exchange rates and marginal costs, as opposed to the volatility of exchange rate per se. The relevant measures of macroeconomic volatility are the coefficients of a regression of marginal costs on exchange rates.
Hypothesis 5: a currency is more likely to be used in invoicing if it is associated with low transaction costs. This mechanism can feed on itself if the low costs are driven by the liquidity in the foreign exchange market.
The use of dollars and other currencies in international trade

Overview and data
Empirical evidence on the invoicing choices made by agents in specific countries and on specific types of goods is sparse, with notable exceptions the work on Swedish invoicing
by Friberg (1998 ), Wilander (2006 and Friberg and Wilander (2007) , Canadian invoicing by Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) , and Japan by Oi, Otani, and Shirota (2004 indices, which entails applying these export and import data of countries to identify the shares that are in highly substitutable goods or differential goods. We also construct dummy variables that capture hedging currency preferences. We also provide new insights into transactions costs in foreign exchange markets, and the relative positions of dollar-based and euro-based costs. In our third and final step we test the hypotheses behind the use of dollars and euros in invoicing international trade.
the transition period of the euro, and measured the use of the euro compared with both national currencies (DM, Ffr, etc) and the foreign currencies. 17 The data availability and sources for our study are summarized in our NBER working paper #11127. The availability information varies tremendously across countries in terms of details and time histories. The United Kingdom and Australia have very detailed information on currency invoicing of trade transactions of different commodities or with different country partners. Within Asia, detailed data is available for both Japan and Korea.
Data for the United States is drawn from Customs information used in constructing international price series.
Within Europe, ECB efforts have made available relatively comparable data across many countries. We are grateful to the agencies that provided this information. Looking across countries, in some cases we cannot definitely state whether the data capture the currency of transaction invoicing or currency of transaction settlement.
The Use of the U.S. Dollars in Trade Invoicing
The role of the U.S. dollar is shown in  in the theory section), we observe two main points. First, smaller countries make little use of their own currency on their export transactions. Indeed, a number of small countries do not even report the use of their own currency, suggesting that this activity is limited. An exception to this pattern applies to small euro area countries, where the size of the whole euro area is a better metric than own country size for this hypothesis.
Second, euro area countries make a substantial use of the euro, which is the invoice currency on 40 to 50 percent of (extra euro area) exports. Japanese exporters use the yen on about a third of their exports, while U.K. exporters use the pound sterling on about half of their exports. Broadly similar patterns appear in country imports, with the importing country currency being typically less often used in import transactions than in exports.
A closer look at the detailed invoicing data available for the United States reveals that the use of the dollar in U.S. trade depends on the trading partner. 18 U.S. trade flows to and from Latin America, China, Mexico, as well as with most small countries, are almost 18 The extent to which the dollar is used in bilateral trade transactions is often not identical across the two parties reporting currency use in trade transactions. Given the sampling limitations in the U.S.-sourced data, we defer to foreign source data for currency shares when that foreign data is available.
exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollars. By contrast, foreign currencies appear more prominently in the invoicing of U.S. imports from the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan. what would be expected purely on the basis of direct trade flows with the U.S., an aspect that is particularly strong for Korea, Thailand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Greece.
Indicators of industry composition, transaction costs, and hedging
We assemble data on the industry composition of countries' exports, the pricesensitivity of demand, 's, the foreign exchange transaction costs, Industry composition. All of the twenty-four countries have trade invoicing information for aggregate exports and aggregate imports. Our goal is to determine whether different invoicing patterns are invoked across distinct classes of goods or goods explicitly sorted by price elasticity of demand. To capture industry structure on exports we apply the Rauch (1999) measure to trade data. Rauch (1999) provides a painstaking classification of commodities at the three and four-digit SITC level into one of three categories: "organized exchange" good is anything that has an overt market (i.e. precious metals); a "referenced priced" good is a homogeneous good that nonetheless does not have a substantial enough volume to have an "official" market (e.g. some chemical products), but that because of its homogeneity does have "reference" prices that are published in trade magazines. All other goods are classified as "differentiated", including the bulk of manufactured products.
Organized exchange traded goods are those that are most highly substitutable with similar categories of foreign produced goods, and the differentiated products least substitutable. We index exports of differentiated goods by n, exports in organized exchange traded goods by w (for Walrasian), and exports in reference priced goods by r.
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Ideally, we would test the implications of our theoretical setup by looking at invoicing patterns across the different sectors of the economy. Such detailed data are unfortunately available only for four countries, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The invoicing patterns for exports of n, w, or r goods are shown in Table 2 . Consistent with our theoretical Hypothesis 1, the exporter's currency is more commonly used on exports of differentiated goods than on exports of more homogeneous ones. The United States is an exception, as the dollar is used across the board.
Turning to the other countries where detailed invoicing data are not available, we denote the share of a country e's exports that are classified as type i by i e  , where
denotes the share of a country e's exports that are classified as more homogeneous (the sum of r plus w types), shown in Table 3 . The first column shows the share 19 Using the detailed sectoral elasticities of substitution computed by Broda and Weinstein (2006) as a consistency check, we find that r and w goods tend to have higher substitution elasticities than n goods. 20 We do an analogous exercise also on the import side for each country, with qualitatively similar findings.
Consistent with the industry details available from Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the prevalence of these exports of homogeneous goods appears to "explain" the widespread vehicle currency use of the dollar in most of the countries. 21 Yet, clearly industry composition and trade with the United States are not complete explanations for use of dollars in export transactions, as shown by the presence of several outliers around the 45 degree line. Countries that use the U.S. dollar less than "expected" include Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, while countries with a larger role or the U.S. dollar than "expected" include Malaysia, Thailand, Korea and Greece.
Transaction costs. We proxy transaction costs in foreign exchange markets by the pattern of bid -ask spreads of each country currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the pound using monthly data for 1995 through 2007 (the last day of the month from Bloomberg). "Pips", the basis point spreads between bid and ask exchange rates divided by the average of these two rates, are used to indicate rankings of transaction costs by currency pair and over time. 22 For our discussion and econometric analysis we use the median difference in pips on using euros versus pips on using dollars over the course of each year.
An analysis of the detailed data, not reported for brevity, reveals that the U.S. dollar is typically the lowest transaction cost currency in foreign exchange markets. This is however not uniformly the case. While the difference in pips across euros and dollars shows that the pips associated with using dollars is generally lower, there are some periods where transacting through euros is temporarily cheaper for a handful of countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Thailand). For smaller countries within or around the European Union, the dollar transaction advantage has been eroded or in some cases lost, providing less incentive for using dollars in export invoicing. 23 The specific datasources and details are presented in the Appendix of the working paper version of this paper.
A potential concern with our specification is that we overlook that reference prices in world markets can be updated at higher frequencies than quarterly, in which case our quarterly measure is not ideally suited. Given the lack of higher frequency wage and consumption data, especially for our broad sample of countries, the quarterly frequency is the highest available one. 24 This specification does not fully capture the potential sensitivity of costs to exchange rates. Since w e can be interpreted as broader than wages, an alternative measure could capture the cost of capital and production components in each country. If imported components are sizeable, the covariance computations should also reflect invoicing on capital imports. Recall that to measure     Exchange rate regimes. In Charts 1 and 2, some of the outlier countries appear to be participants in de facto or de jure participation in currency blocs, suggesting a potential role for exchange rate regimes in currency invoicing. In some regression specifications we take explicit account of whether a country is in a de jure or de facto euro or dollar bloc.
Econometrics of herding, coalescing, and transaction costs in currency invoicing
Our discussion of equations (5)- (7) emphasized that the invoicing shares reflect industry structure, the size of the destination market, the structure of correlations between exchange rates, marginal costs and destination market demand conditions, and transaction costs. In this section, we use the measures described above to conduct econometric tests of these aspects for the international use of the dollar and the euro use. The data sample of observations, by exporting country-years, is detailed in Column (3) shows that the share of homogeneous goods in country exports, 1995; 1996; 2000 , Poland 1994 , Portugal 2000 missing for both euro and dollar invoicing), Slovakia 1999 -2003 , Slovenia 2000 , Spain 1998 missing for both euro and dollar invoicing), Thailand 1993 -2003 , United Kingdom 1999 Columns (8) through (14) 
The results are shown in Table 5 . Columns 1 and 2 show that a country's exports to the euro area and its size relative to the euro area explain about one third of the use of the euro in invoicing. The coefficients are significantly smaller than in the dollar regressions, so that an increase in the orientation of exports towards the euro area elicits a smaller increase in euro use than was the case for dollar use and exports to the United States. The sign on the homogeneous goods share (column 3-5) is negative and consistently significant, showing that a high share of homogeneous goods in a country's exports is associated with a low use of euros in invoicing exports. The independent explanatory power of this term is significant, at 18 percent of sample variability. As was the case for the dollar, hedging and transaction cost 29 Note we allow for the fact that some countries had their status as members change over the time frame we are examining. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25070.htm variables do not contribute explanatory power to euro use in invoicing (columns 6-7). Taken together, these variables explain 50 percent of the cross-country use of euros (columns 8-9), with a stronger fit when we focus on recent years (since 1999, column 10).
Controls for whether the exporting country is a member of the European Union are introduced in columns (11) and (12), with this status changing for some countries over the observation period. Specifications with this added control explain three quarters of the euro use in invoicing international trade. The resulting coefficients associated with export shares and country size have the interpretation that invoicing in euros rises one to one with the euro area as a destination market, but less so for countries that are large relative to the euro area, with euro use basically negated for countries as large as the United States. Invoicing in euros declines substantially when homogeneous goods are involved in trade transactions.
Evidence for the five hypotheses. Overall, our econometric analysis provides perspective on the strength of the five hypotheses outlined at the end of section 3 for the cases of of the dollar and the euro. We find evidence that homogenous goods are more likely to be invoiced in a vehicle currency, which in this case is the dollar (Hypothesis 1); that country size matters with exports from relatively small to relatively large countries more likely to be invoiced in the destination currency (Hypothesis 2) and less likely to be invoiced in the exporter's currency (Hypothesis 3). Hedging considerations played only a marginal role (Hypothesis 4), as did transaction costs (Hypothesis 5).
Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical analysis combines alternative motives that influence the use of specific currencies in invoicing the trade transactions of countries. We collect and analyze crosscountry information on the use of different currencies in such activities, and examine alternative hypotheses in the context of this data, applying the Rauch (1999) indices to trade data. Our analysis shows that the dollar is strongly used on most trade transactions with the United States, especially for smaller countries, and on other transactions that are primarily in goods that are traded on organized exchanges or reference priced. This role of the dollar as a transaction currency in international trade has elements of industry coalescing around a single currency. We find little evidence that the dollar, in recent years, has been used in invoicing trade for the purpose of hedging covariances among macroeconomic fundamentals or that it has been influenced by changing transaction costs in foreign exchange markets. The use of the euro as an invoicing currency is explained primarily by trade closeness with the euro area, or direct participation in the euro area. The use of euros in this trade invoicing is smaller among the countries with more market share relative to total euro area imports and are heavier exporters of homogeneous goods.
Industries with highly substitutable goods have a strong incentive to coalesce in their invoicing choice. The U.S. dollar is important in the invoicing of world trade both because the United States is an important consumer and producer in world markets, because of exchange rate regime considerations where various countries peg their currencies to the dollar, and because relatively homogeneous goods still are an important part of international trade transactions. These forces support a continuation of this role unless such conditions were to be greatly changed. The strength of the euro area as a destination market for trade, and proximity to the euro area, explain most of the invoicing use of euros through the present time. Exports to US plus non-US RW type exports as Share of Country Exports
